Miranda Fricker: Epistemic Injustice

Miranda Fricker (2003) outlines an understanding of epistemic injustice as granting credibility excess or deficits to a subject's testimony due to an implicit judgement of their character. Fricker argues that these "prejudicial dysfunctions in testimonial practice" (pg.164) can be reliably addressed through the virtue of "Reflexive Critical Openness" (pg.170). In the exploration of this virtue and key examples of how it presents, I will make the argument that while it is an epistemic issue, it also shapes a moral and ethical concern with how we treat people and that without the virtue of Reflexive Critical Openness, the acquisition of knowledge through testimony becomes incredibly difficult. 

To Fricker, gaining knowledge from testimony requires her notion of testimonial sensibility, which, when possessed, allows the hearer to gain "knowledge that p simply by being told that p" (2003). The virtue of reflexive critical openness upholds testimonial sensibility, enabling knowledge from testimony to be gained. Though important, Fricker argues, it is limited in its ability to completely curb prejudice in testimony reception. Fricker separates epistemic injustice into two main spheres: testimonial and hermeneutical. 

Testimonial injustice is when the hearer takes the speaker's words less seriously or dismisses them altogether due to ingrained prejudice against the speaker, deliberately and indeliberately. This could present itself as a female doctor being taken less seriously than a male one. However, it's not restricted explicitly to sex but also due to the social perception of the doctor as more feminine. Another example would be the assumption that someone with a heavy accent associated with the global south may be considered less educated than someone with an accent associated with the global north. This is a type of epistemic injustice as it impedes the hearer from gaining knowledge from the speaker due to their prejudice, it also obstructs the speaker from being able to impart knowledge to the hearer as they are ascribed credibility deficits. 

Hermeneutical injustice refers to a gap of understanding formed between groups when one does not have the words to articulate their experience fully, or the other does not have enough shared experiences to understand it. Fricker uses the example of sexual harassment and the difficulty women in the workplace experienced before they were able to put a name to the behaviour they were being subjected to. Through consciousness-raising and sharing their similar experiences, the women realised this wasn't a one-off situation but a pattern of behaviour in society. It wasn't until they had contacted lawyers and coined the term ‘sexual harassment' that women were able to put a name to their experience and feel solidarity with each other (Fricker, 2007). Hermeneutical injustice impedes epistemic efforts as it creates a seemingly unbridgeable gap, causing people without experience to be unable to gain knowledge from the other party and those without the language to communicate their experience to be unable to pass on knowledge to the inexperienced party as well. 

There is a convergence of these two spheres in the example of non-verbal epistemic injustice. Dr Lucienne Spencer (2023) outlines testimonial injustice experienced by late-stage Dementia patients by their carers. In this case study, I will add that they experience a hermeneutical injustice and explore what this means for the acquisition of knowledge from these individuals for their carers. Spencer highlights the deficiency in understanding non-verbal forms of communication due to a prejudice against the image of the non-verbal communicator; she calls this 'Non-verbal Testimonial Injustice'. A large percentage of human interactions are non-verbal, for example, we signal with our eyes and faces when a conversation is uncomfortable or scary, with our bodies when we like a person or don't, and with movements when we wish to tell someone where to go or to look at something. We are able to take something from these interactions and derive meaning or knowledge from these movements. It is in this vein that we, as the onlooker, are also able to unjustly characterise the gesturing or moving person as having a "credibility excess {or} deficit" (Fricker, 2003 pg.164). For people with language-inhibiting dementia, non-verbal communication becomes necessary for their ability to express feelings such as pain, anger, or sadness. Due to the social perceptions of people with dementia as being "child-like, stupid, or in a vegetative state" (Spencer 2023, pg 69), these non-verbal expressions can often be ignored or misinterpreted. Our attitudes towards older generations or people with these conditions render our testimonial sensibility flawed, leading us to impose a credibility deficit onto the non-verbal party. 

This instance of epistemic injustice is both hermeneutical and testimonial; there is a gap in understanding between the non-verbal person and the hearer — or, in this case, the viewer — one that prevents the non-verbal party from being able to fully articulate their feelings and prevents the viewing party from being able to completely understand their experience. If the viewing subject is a carer, their testimonial sensibility should be underpinned by an understanding of non-verbal testimony, allowing them to communicate with the person with dementia in a meaningful and understanding capacity. The ignorance of these movements or the complete writing off of their gestures is testimonial injustice. Spencer (2023) gives the example of the way late-stage dementia patients are treated in care facilities, where staff will remove their autonomy by — instead of asking a patient if they would like to be fed or to feed themselves — ignoring their non-verbal communication and feeding them instead. These actions are not only infantilising and disrespectful but also very irresponsible. Epistemically, this is damaging; the verbal party removes the non-verbal party from their position as a participant in knowledge transfer, both rendering themselves unable to receive knowledge and disadvantaging the non-verbal party. In this way, we see both hermeneutical and testimonial epistemic injustices become apparent in non-verbal communication. 

In her article, Fricker uses the examples of 'To Kill a Mockingbird' and 'Talented Mr Ripley' to demonstrate examples of epistemic injustice in popular media. Another example of this would be the 1942 short story 'The Catbird Seat' written by James Thurber and originally published in The New Yorker. The story revolves around the character of Mr Martin, a straight edge, non-drinker or smoker, head of the filing department at his company, F & S. Mr Martin is introduced to Mrs Ulgine Barrows, a rather loud and tactless woman who he immediately hates. She became an adviser to the company's president after wooing him at a party, a fact we learned from Mr Martin's perspective. When he discovers that she is thinking of making changes in his department, he plans to murder her, though, on the night the murder is to take place, he gets nervous and is unable to complete his task. After sitting down with her, having a drink and smoking a cigarette — a fact she laughs about considering his well-known aversion to the two habits — he confesses to a plan to murder their boss. He states, "I am preparing a bomb, {…} which will blow the old goat higher than hell" (Thurber, 1942, p.17). She questions his sanity, asking if he has taken drugs, to which he replies, "Heroin,{...} I'll be coked to the gills when I bump that old buzzard off". Mrs Barrows recounts these events to her boss the next day, who then accuses her of having a severe breakdown due to the stress of her new job and suggests she call a psychiatrist to aid her in her condition. They refer to her using words such as "Delusional" and "Hysterical" before she is escorted home by a member of staff, and Mr Martin is apologised to and asked to dismiss the incident from his mind. 

In this story, both Mr Martin and Mrs Barrows are subject to testimonial prejudice. Mr Martin is afforded credibility excess due to his position as a long-time employee of the company and the perceived goodness of his character despite Mrs Barrows's testimony. Mrs Barrows, on the other hand, is subjected to significant credibility deficits. Her sanity is questioned, and Mr Martin repeatedly disparages her character. Misogynistic stereotyping reduces her to a hysterical woman, lying and breaking down under the stress of a career. Her unapologetically large personality was a target for misogynistic prejudice from the start of the story, and their disbelief in her testimony comes not only from her positionality as a woman but also from Mr Martins as a man. 

In both examples, testimonial prejudice reduces a subject's ability to be epistemically effective and genuinely engage in knowledge-seeking. Mr Martin's boss is unable to take in the knowledge that his employee confessed to wanting to murder him due to his misogynistic prejudice against Mrs Barrows and his clear prejudice towards Mr Martin. The carers in the first example unknowingly or knowingly impede the late-stage dementia patients from being able to take part in knowledge transfer and hinder their own ability to effectively understand the information they are receiving from the non-verbal party. In doing this, they have shut off an entire stream of information; epistemically, this is both damaging and irresponsible as it is in both parties' best interest to be able to communicate and receive knowledge from one another. It also guides us in how we treat people, carer or not; in order to have a respectful and engaged interaction with another person, we must first understand their means of communication. A bias towards non-verbal communication often comes from a place of ageism and pathophobia. I would argue we have a moral and ethical responsibility to not exclude these people from fruitful conversation and interaction. A possible solution to this, as Fricker argues, is Reflexive Critical Openness, a virtue that should underpin our testimonial sensibility. Reflexive Critical Openness is having the capacity to reflect on our own assumptions and motivations for our judgements as well as being able to be critically open to the ideas of the knowledge transmitting party.  Having and properly exercising this virtue allows the interpreter to effectively take in information without being easily misinformed while also recognising and attempting to decode any existing prejudice in their characterisation of the other person. 

Fricker admits however, to the limitations of this virtue, stating, 

“A setting where there is little critical awareness of gender is a setting in which no-one is in a position to possess the virtue of reflexive critical openness vis-a-vis gender prejudice of any subtle kind” (2003, p.170)

Fricker argues that a person's ability to exercise this virtue is dependent on the cultural-historical setting, which impacts not their guilt in enacting this injustice but their culpability. In the examples given earlier in this essay, the Carer who knowingly ignores the non-verbal communication of the late-stage dementia patient is culpable for their injustice as they are in the position to know better. There is an argument to be made, however, that Mr Martin's boss is not culpably at fault due to the socio-historical context of the 1940s and the general attitude towards women and women in the workplace at that time. But where does this leave us? And at what point can we soundly make the judgment that the truth/knowledge-seeking party is culpable for their lack of Reflexive Critical Openness? Fricker says the answer is unclear. We can theoretically draw a line between being in a position to know better and a position not to know, but in actual cases and examples, it becomes hard to point the finger. 

Ultimately, it isn't a question of blame but of understanding that possessing this virtue allows a truth/knowledge seeker like Mr Martin's boss to be open towards testimony, allowing him to gain knowledge from that interaction and make it epistemically viable. If you are closed off or prejudiced to the person imparting the knowledge, the acquisition of it becomes extremely difficult. In this way, the virtue of Reflexive Critical Openness in response to epistemic injustice reveals itself as an inherently epistemic strategy. Fricker's illustration of this virtue poses an essential resolution to addressing this issue, and examining epistemic interactions through this lens allows us to recognise the role that testimonial prejudice plays in acquiring knowledge through testimony. 

References

1. Fricker, M 2003, ‘Epistemic Injustice And A Role For Virtue In The Politics Of Knowing’, Metaphilosophy, vol. 34, no. 1–2, pp. 154–173

2. Fricker, M 2007, Epistemic injustice : Power and the ethics of knowing, Oxford University Press, Oxford

3. Spencer, L 2023, ‘Epistemic Injustice in Late-Stage Dementia: A Case for Non-Verbal Testimonial Injustice’, A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy, vol 16, no. 1, pp. 62–79

4. Thurber, J 1942, ‘The Catbird Seat’, The New Yorker, 14 November, P. 17