This is my first essay which I recently turned in for my Philosophy class. It discusses the role of madness in revolution and how Epistemic humility factors into revolutionary development. To be entirely honest, I think the essay leaves something to be desired in terms of structure, and at times, it can feel quite disjointed. However, I think it is important for me to hold space for pieces of writing I may not find 100% perfect or even continue to fully agree with, that being one of the points of creating this blog in the first place: growth and development in beliefs and opinions. References will be included below.
‘Within the framework of political philosophy, how are madness and revolutionary action intertwined? And does epistemic humility have a place in the argument for revolution?’
Without madness, there is no revolutionary action; action that takes place outside the bounds of what we define as reason is needed to enact change, which shifts our understanding of what is acceptable in society. The ranging effects of the vilification of madness and overemphasis on reason dissuade progressive social movements by systematically breaking them apart and devaluing collective action. As a whole, humans need to be more certain of their actions and knowledge; however, individually, we place too much emphasis on epistemic self-sufficiency, and in that, we need to decenter ourselves and employ epistemic humility. In contrast, for collective action to go against the norm and for revolutionary action to take place successfully, we need collective epistemic certainty in our objectives and a strong belief that through our joint knowledge, we can envision something better for each other.
We must first define reason before we can assess its place in revolutionary action. Dr La Marr Jurelle Bruce (2021 pg4) defines reason in two parts, capital-R Reason and lowercase-r reason. Capital-R Reason refers to the process of upholding systems of 'truth' through the pursuit of a "Secularist, enlightenment-rooted episteme" (Bruce 2021 pg4), while lowercase-r reason is simply the process of forming conclusions about a given situation. Ismatu Gwendolyn (2023) explores this distinction further by characterising 'Reason' as a more active political "school of thought". Reason is used as a tool of excludability to distinguish who, within a society, is "compliant with {the} world-makings … and who is deviant" (Gwendolyn 2023). Through this understanding of reason, we can begin to unpack the importance of acting outside of it, in the space that could be considered madness.
The distinctions between sanity and insanity lend to the normalisation of violent, oppressive behaviour, such as the normalcy of misogyny and racism or, in a more specific case, the consistent defence of the death penalty. By delineating certain groups as without reason or particular behaviours as outside the norm within this specific school of thought, we as a society are encouraged to accept the violent mistreatment of these groups, both systemically and interpersonally.
Madness is slightly less rigid in its definition and can be broken down into many subcategories; there is "medicalized madness" (Bruce 2021 pg 7), which acts as as more clinical understanding based on the ever-changing scientific definition of madness and "phenomenal madness" (Bruce 2021 pg 6) which is the more self-described form focusing on the subjective experience of reality. Bruce goes on to describe two more forms of madness, rage and psychosocial, which will be the two ideas of madness I will generally be referring to throughout this essay. Rage relates to the consistent conflation of angriness or displeasure with insanity. Bruce specifically references the caricatures made of black people in America who resist the historical and systemic violence imposed on them by society. The conflation of rage and insanity detracts from the validity of one's rage and is a tool of white supremacist patriarchy to maintain its forced authority. Psychosocial madness is, simply put, a deviation from the norm. Where the judge and jury of what is 'reasonable' in medicalised or rage-based madness are people in positions of power, psychosocial madness is judged by each other, we become the arbiters of what is 'normal' and what is not when we reject that which exists outside the status quo.
Dualisms like Reason vs Madness, Right vs Wrong, and True vs False posit inherent value to either side. Madness is seen as the contradiction of reason, assigned negative value and regarded as impeding progress. I argue, however, that for any large-scale social change, a revolution of sorts, to occur, madness must be at the forefront. There is a conflation between reason and morality and the perpetuation of the idea that through reason and reason only, we can pursue "the good life" and become a "fully moral agent" (Mbembe, 2003). This seemingly innocuous way of framing reason becomes a tool of white supremacist patriarchal propaganda as it places humanity and emotions as less than valuable and productive in achieving the aforementioned ‘good life’. By framing morality as reason and the criteria for humanity as morality, we see the natural conclusion that anything without reason is less than human and that the dehumanisation of natural emotional responses and behaviour allows world makers in our society to disrupt revolutionary action and paint it as simple 'madness'. Suppose we are to operate on the idea that madness is rage, disruption, or resistance, then is revolution not also completely mad? The value of revolutionary action is that it disrupts the norm, and even before there are tangible revolutionary changes in the world, we have to conjure up the idea of society we fight for in the first place and existing in that space of endless possibility is as unreasonable as anything else because it defies all pillars of normative thought.
Reason has been considered the means through which we are able to experience liberation historically; the ever-changing definition of who can practise reason has been a tool through which revolutionary action has been quashed due to the invitation of previously disruptive and outcasted groups into the fold of superiority. This is often enacted through the education system, which punishes dissenting voices and sets a trend of fear intertwined with disobedience while actively rewarding those who submit to the system and begin to perpetuate it (Freire, 1968). As these exclusive dualistic spheres of understanding suggest, "If … Reason is requisite for "becoming a fully moral agent," they also imply the inverse—that unReason entails moral deficiency and ineptitude" (Bruce 2021 pg4). As we have seen through the vilification of rage and anger at unjust systems as obstructive and unhelpful, the mere suggestion of change and the insinuation that there may be a better way to form society cannot be entertained as rational so as to maintain the hegemonic power of world makers and disrupt community action which seeks to oppose social norms. Through this understanding, we can see that not only does madness have a place in revolutionary action, but it is critical to the birth of change in any tangible way.
The idea of revolution begs the question of what role the individual plays in large-scale social change and whether or not there is a place for epistemic humility in the fight for societal reconfiguration. Socrates describes the wisdom in the ability to admit your gaps in knowledge as imperative (Plato, 1895); the ability to be conscious of how little we know individually is an important part of political movements and philosophy. Unfortunately, the value of having humility in your epistemic endeavours is often lost in political and social discourse, with an emphasis placed on "intellectual self-sufficiency" (Nguyen, 2019). This is the idea that we have to be one hundred per cent independent in our acquisition of knowledge, which sets the basis for an inherent mistrust of others and a suspicion towards community. In turn, we end up teaching ourselves to "Ignore … testimony, be it supportive or condemnatory of our own beliefs" (Nguyen, 2019 pg327).
Branford Marsalis discusses this culture of intellectual arrogance in the documentary 'Before The Music Dies' (2021); he recalls his students and their constant need for praise, stating, "We live in a country that seems to be in this massive state of delusion, where the idea of what you are is more important than you actually being that". (Marsailes, 2021 1:16:37-1:17:36)
We live in a confusing cultural mix of individual arrogance and collective hesitance, and as Marsails reveals, a culture that violently rejects the suggestion of a change to this dynamic. The idea that our presentation of intelligence is more important than our actual understanding "actually works just as long as everybody's winking at the same time. If one person stops winking, you just beat the crap out of that person, and they either start winking or go somewhere else" (Marsailes, 2021 1:16:37-1:17:36)
Our collective response to the possibility of change is often one of violent suppression, we automatically reject difference. C. Thi Nguyen would argue that this stems from a lack of humility, and so too may Mersail.
On the other hand, Neil Levy posits that both intellectual humility and intellectual arrogance are too common in society. He argues that the individual arrogance of some may be one cause for the "apparent rise in and even respectability of bizarre beliefs" but that intellectual humility can also cause someone to abandon their beliefs at the mere suggestion of an alternate opinion. I argue that we are arrogant in our beliefs individually but collectively; for political action to occur, we must be somewhat intellectually certain. It is integral to revolutionary action that we are united as a collective and that we are at least semi-sure that we can agree on a better future for each other and ourselves.
The idea of revolution may seem abstract, but historically, as we've seen it play out, some of the many faults have been a lack of epistemic humility and an overemphasis on individuality and reason. Something as groundbreaking as societal reconfiguration exists outside of our scope of understanding and, therefore, needs madness to exist, and the way in which we characterise this madness as a society is an incredibly impactful tool utilised by white supremacist patriarchy to destroy revolutionary conversation. By detracting from its validity and casting it off as insane and undeserving of recognition, word makers can divide communities and prevent connected social upheaval.
References
Plato, 1895, Apology of Socrates, Ginn & Company, Boston
Pedro, Z 2021, Before the Music Dies DVD, 2006 Documentary Doyle Bramhall II, Youtube, viewed 18 April 2024, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EnMHWGwYuJs>
Bruce, Dr. LMJ 2021, How to Go Mad Without Losing Your Mind: Madness and Black Radical Creativity, Duke University Press, London
Nguyen, CT 2019, ‘Self-Trust and Epistemic Humility’, in JC Wright (ed.), Humility, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Mbembe, A 2003, Necropolitics, Duke University Press, London
Friere, P 1968, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc, New York
Gwendolyn, I 2021, ‘There Is No Revolution without Madness.’, Threadings, weblog post, 9 November, viewed 14 April 2024 <https://ismatu.substack.com/p/there-is-no-revolution-without-madness?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2>
Levy, N 2023, ‘Too humble for words’, Springer link, pp. 3141–3160
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